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DURATION OF COPYRIGHT.
The term of copyright in the United States is twenty-eight
years, with a right of renewal by the author, or his widow or
children if he be dead, for a further term of fourteen years.
This renewal right does not extend to a husband or to grand-
children if children be dead, or even to parents, so that the
death of an unmarried author ends a copyright at the end of
twenty-eight years, no matter what its value may be, or how
many people may be dependent upon the life of the author.
The statute, too, is silent on the question of the renewal of
copyrights in encyclopedias, or other books where the literary
work is the result of a combination of effort. Under the law
as it stands, it would seem that it is the duty of the publisher
of any of our large encyclopedias at the end of the twenty-
eight-year term, to seek out each individual author, or his
widow or children, if he left any, and secure the application for
a renewal.
The renewed term is to be obtained by "recording the title
of the work a second time and complying with all other regula-
tions in regard to original copyrights within six months before
the expiration of the first term, and within two months of the
date of the renewal causing a copy of the record thereof to be
published in one or more newspapers printed in the United
States for the space of four weeks."
This is a cumbersome and unsatisfactory arrangement. If
forty-two years is a proper term for literary protection it
should be granted once for all, upon such conditions as Con-
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gress sees fit to impose. Nothing is gained at the present time
by requiring a notice of the renewal to be published. The
records of the copyright office at Washington are so complete
and full that no publisher would look through the files of the
newspapers of the United States to learn of a renewal, but
would ascertain it by a telegram to Washington.
There is frequently confusion as to the right of an assignee
of copyright to take out the renewal and litigation results there.
from. If it was originally supposed that authors were like
sailors-the wards of the nation-and provision should be made
to protect them against their own improvidence, even that
object is not accomplished, because in practically all assign-
ments of copyright, rights of extension and renewal are
included. It is often very burdensome for an assignee to ascer-
tain in the names of what persons renewals should be taken
out. This frequently occurs in the case of writers of music
who have entirely disappeared from sight before the lapse of
twenty-eight years, leaving no trace behind. It has been said
of one music publisher in Boston that he must constantly con-
stitute himself a court of divorce and legitimacy, making
world-wide inquiries.
It is not clear that the assignee is entitled to such renewal
even though he paid the author a full price for all rights in his
literary work. The statute gives the renewal right directly to
the widow or children, and the question has never been brought
before the courts whether an assignee could compel them to
assign the renewal right.
But the most serious objection to the present term is that
the renewed term frequently expires during the life-time of the
author. The copyrights of several of Edward Everett Hale's
works have expired, and Mr. Howells and" Mr. Clemens will
have the same experience at no distant day. Certainly an
author should have the right to the earnings of his works
during his life-time and for a limited period his family should
have the same after his death.
The provision of the English law is much more intelligent,
giving copyright for a term of "forty-two years from publica-
tion, or until seven years from the death of the author, which-
ever shall be longest."
It is interesting to note how the term of copyright, both in
England and the United States, has been gradually extended.
The first copyright act in England, the Statute of Anne, gave
a term of twenty-one years from the tenth day of April, 17zo ,
DURATION OF COPYRIGHT.
to all works already printed, and a term of fourteen years to all
works thereafter printed, with a right of renewal, if the author
was living, for another term of fourteen years.
This is the famous statute which destroyed common law
rights in literary property. Up to the Statute of Anne,
literary property, even in published works, had existed at
common law in perpetuity, and even after the Statute of Anne
and the expiration of the term therein provided, injunctions
were issued in favor of various works, such as Milton's "Paradise
Lost," Pope's and Swift's "Miscellanies," "The Whole Dutyof
Man," and Thompson's "Seasons," on the supposition that the
act was intended only to give additional remedies and penalties
during the specified term, and not to limit copyright itself to
that term.
In 1774 Donaldson v. Beckett was decided by the House of
Lords, deterfaining that copyright itself was limited to the
statutory term.
In 1775 an act was passed giving to the universities of
Oxford and Cambridge perpetual copyright in books given or
bequeathed to them, although in 1878 it appeared that Oxford
owned only six copyrights and Cambridge none.
In 1814 the term of copyright was extended to twenty-eight
year, or if the author were living at its expiration, for his life.
In 1842 the term was extended to a period of forty-two
years, or seven years beyond the life of the author, whichever
term was the longer. The passage of this act was the result of
protracted and brilliant debate in which Disraeli, Lord
Houghton, Hume, Grote and Lord Macauley participated.
The bill which was introduced in 1838 proposed a term of
sixty years, which, largely through Lord Macauley's opposi-
tion, was cut down to forty-two years, or the life of the author.
An amendment giving an additional seven Years after the
author's death was adopted in spite of Lord Macauley's opposi-
tion.
In most countries the term is longer than either in England
or the United States. In Germany, Japan, Austria and Switzer-
land it extends for thirty years after the death of the author:
in France, Belgium, Portugal and eleven other countries, for
fifty years after the author's death, and in Spain the term is
for eighty years and the life of the author.
In the United States the term of copyright has been extended
from time to time up to its present limit. Five of the colonial
statutes, prior to the constitution, gave a term of fourteen
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years, and three of them a term of twenty-one years. The
first act passed by Congress, 1790, provided for an original term
of fourteen years, with a right of renewal for fourteen, practi-
cally following the English statute.
In 1831 the term was extended to its present length of
twenty-eight years, with a right of renewal for fourteen years.
It is generally conceded that a single term, without renewal,
should be established, but the utmost variety of opinion exists
with regard to its proper length.
The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the
power to grant copyright for a limited time. so that copyright
in perpetuity is not possible in this country without a change
of constitution.
It is not to be supposed that any evasion of the constitu-
tion, such as the term once proposed of a thousand years, would
be sustained by the court. The framers of the constitution
had before them the existing copyright terms in the various
colonies, as well as the English term, and cannot be conceived
to have intended a term marked by centuries rather than by
years. Exactly how long a term would come within the
meaning of the constitution none can predict, but undoubtedly
any such term as now exists abroad would be upheld.
.Mr. Clemens has contributed a very interesting suggestion to
this discussion through the pages of the North American Review.
He proposes that beginning with the forty-second year of any
copyright the owner shall be required to keep a cheap edition upon
the market sold at twenty-five cents per one hundred thousand
words, or less, and that so long as he does this his copyright shall
continue. This meets the requisite that the public is entitled to
cheap editions of all works after the expiration of the statutory
period, and also retains for the author and his family the control
of his works and gives them a small revenue from cheap works
and a large return from such high priced editions as can be sold.
This plan, by possibility, might result in perpetual copyright,
and in many cases would result in prolonged terms. It may be
questioned whether such a provision would come within the con-
stitutional power to grant "for limited times to authors and invent-
ors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
A term of protection which is longer for one work than for another
and a term liable to be defeated by a three months' failure to keep
a cheap edition on sale would be a novelty and a radical departure
from precedent. The suggestion indeed has the double charm of
novelty and of justice in a field marked by much injustice and
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prosaic following of precedent. It is perhaps too much to hope
that it can or will be adopted.
If the proposed revision of the entire copyright system is under-
taken by the next Congress and a bill is reported to that end by the
Committee on Patents no single question will probably receive more
consideration than that of the duration of copyright protection.
Two things seem fairly clear. The term ought, in any event,
to include the life of the author. So long as he lives an author
ought to control the form in which his works shall be presented
to the public, and he ought to receive such income as comes from
them. Every sense of fair dealing is outraged by the idea of taking
his property from a man in his old age. The world is not in accord
with Lord Camden that "it would be unworthy such men (authors)
to traffic with a dirty bookseller for so much a sheet of letterpress"
or when his Lordship said, speaking of Milton "He knew that the
real price of his work was immortality and that posterity would
pay it." Posterity is a poor paymaster and immortality a small
compensation for present penury.
Such ideas arose when literary men were forced to seek a noble
patron and a gratuity. The profession of letters did not exist.
The patron to-day is the public and royalties have taken the place
of gratuities. And the patron is a generous one. It is not too
much to say that every reader of a book that is worth while would
prefer that a part of the price paid should go to the author so long
as he lived and would be indignant if told that publishers had
entered into the author's right.
It is equally clear that an" author should be able to leave his
family the usufruct of his work for a reasonable time after his
death.
There is no abstract reason why men should not have the right
to leave to their offspring the work of their brain. Everything that
can be said in favor of absolute ownership of the work of a man's
hands can be said of the product of his mind, and more. But
society steps in at this point and says that the right of all is greater
than the right of any one, and that it is necessary at some time that
contributions to knowledge and literature should become public
property. This is what Donaldson v. Beckett means. There was
no necessity for deciding that the Statute of Anne took away the
common law right. Lord Mansfield's decision five years earlier
in Millar v. Taylor that it did not take it away is a more satisfactory
discussion of the Statute than the opinions over-ruling it. The dis-
cussion in the House of Lords after the coming in of the six to five
opinion of judges, shows that the case was determined upon grounds
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of public policy and not upon the somewhat accidental language
of the Statute. The failure after a century and a quarter to
re-enact the perpetual right shows that more than the words "and
no longer" in the Statute stood between authors and the perpetual
"right of copy."
The same is clear in our own decision of Wheaton v. Peters, and
in the words "for limited times" in our constitution.
So that the question to be decided is, at what time does the
public need require that private copyright shall cease? No help is
to be had from the term of patents. The industrial world needs
the right to use inventions speedily. Progress in mechanical and
electrical arts is constantly stayed by prior patents, to which tribute
must be paid. The daily life and work of the people is affected.
And besides there is no such thing as "fair use" of a patent. An
author's work may be quoted, criticised, made the basis of discus-
sion up to the point of reducing its salability. No other writer
is hampered by it. So that he does original work, he may reach,
write and publish the same result as the original author and may
use the latter's work to help him do so. Not so the patent. It is
an absolute barrier and its existence should be short.
Where, then, does public necessity require that the atithor's
right should give way. There was no need that "Uncle Tom's
Cabin" should belong to the public while Mrs. Stowe or her
children lived. The book did its great work while it was protected.
The public lost none of its dynamic force because royalty was paid
on it by its publishers. It would not now. Nor is the public
mulcted in high prices for such works. As books get older and the
demand falls off, every publisher meets the market with a cheaper
edition. It cannot be shown that prices are kept up for forty-two
years and ought then to be lowered. Good business judgment takes
care of the question.
I have cited Uncle Tom's Cabin, which is Mr. Clemens' illustra-
tion, but others might be taken. The public necessity did not
require that "A Man Without A Country" should go out of copy-
right or that Mr. Hale should be deprived of the revenue from it.
The law in its operation in this case is nothing short of robbery.
And so of Lowell's and Prescott's and Howells' work and Mr.
Clemens' himself. What jury that ever sat would find in Clemens
v. The People that The People were entitled to a single "Mark
Twain" while Mr. Clemens or any of his family lived?
Of course the question when it arises will settle itself by com-
promise, and what that will be no one can predict. But it can fairly
he said that seven years beyond an author's life is not adequate
recognition of an author's claim.
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The English Royal Commission in 1878 recommended a term
of thirty years beyond the life of the author. Though this recom-
mendation fell with the rest of the report, the term recommended
is the one adopted by four countries of high attainments. Fifteen
countries have settled upon the term of fifty years beyond the
author's life.
Though this country is apt to strike out trails of its own, the
blazing is pretty clear if we choose to follow it.
There seems to be no reason under our decisions why the term,
if extended, should not be made applicable to existing copyrights.
Congress has gone far, especially in the early part of the last
century in extending patents and copyrights already existing, and
in granting new terms where the original had expired. Similar
patent enactments were sustained by the courts. More recently
(Act of March 3, 1893) Congress granted full terms of copyright
protection to work already published and fallen into the public
domain by reason of a failure to comply with one of the conditions
of obtaining copyright. Samuel L" Elder.
